Consultations on a Bold and

Proper US-China-led AI Treaty

Multidisciplinary experts and delegates of key humanist US AI powerbrokers meet to debate, detail and converge on a preparedness plan for the US Administration for a possible short-term scenario whereby events will call for an extraordinarily bold and timely US-China-led, multi-stakeholder AI treaty-making process.

Washington, DC and remote · Chatham House Rule

Within weeks or months, events will likely call on the President, the Super Intelligence Force and a dozen US AI policy powerbrokers to co-lead a bold, US-China-led AI treaty-making process. These closed-door consultations prepare them for that call — so the US position is built across its divides, not announced over them.

What. One draft, many hands. In small closed-door sessions, the offices that shape US AI policy stress-test and co-edit a single plan for a US-China-led treaty process: where it starts, what triggers each step, how it is enforced, what the US brings to the table. Participants can contribute evidence, objections and red lines; the draft records both agreement and unresolved differences. We convene and facilitate; participants shape the options; we remain responsible for the accuracy and quality of our analysis.

Who. Senior staff, advisors and envoys of executive-branch officials, frontier labs, Congress, and the political, media and faith leaders who shape the President's AI policy — plus a few experts in verification, arms control and China. Mission-aligned think tanks and organizations, as partners or co-hosts.


When. Provisional, to be confirmed: one or more of December 9 (Washington), December 13 (Miami, on the eve of the G20) and January 13 (Washington). Some sessions are open to remote participants.


What's discussed. Seven themes, each an open question — the spine of the conversation, not its answers:

  • The call — what would force the President's hand, and what the first decisions should look like.

  • The sequence — which first steps, what triggers the next, and how to scale fast without losing control.

  • Enforcement — what makes verification "trustworthy enough" for most stakeholders.

  • Bandwidth — the channels, tools and people a treaty needs from day one to scale.

  • The treaty's own risks — net benefit, concentration of power, sovereignty, and their guards.

  • Markets and citizens — what the economy can live with, and what share citizens get.

  • AI consciousness — foster an head-on debate, understanding, convergence, compromise and win-wins on key aspects that are increasingly crucial to policy

Aims, context and the provisional program: see the summary of The Deal of the Century on AI.

Take part. One email is enough: cbpai@trustlesscomputing.org

  • I'd like to take part, as a delegate or an expert.

  • Someone should be in the room — here is a name, and who could make the introduction.

  • We'd like to partner or co-host — think tanks and organizations: rufo@trustlesscomputing.org, with times for a 20-minute call.

Further details

The missing lane. Washington has plenty of convenings on guardrails, standards and China. Few ask: if Trump and Xi were to move — or be moved — beyond protocols toward a bold treaty-making process, what process should the US aim for, and can a critical mass of US AI powerbrokers converge on a plan to steer it to success? That is the lane — Amodei's step two, "democratic coordination," widened from the labs to everyone who shapes the President's AI policy. The September 29 Accord began the labs' coordination; without China, and without the officials and voices who will decide what a treaty says.


Shared goals, different predictions. As in the 1946 Acheson–Lilienthal consultations, we assume contributors largely share humanist goals and diverge on key AI predictions: whether China wins the race, whether superintelligence stays under human control, whether verification can work, whether a treaty can prevent both runaway AI and AI-enabled authoritarianism. The evidence on each is moving fast, and one key figure revising one prediction can reshape a consensus.

How. Each session works on the latest draft: what's wrong, what's missing, what their principal could live with. Structured methods — Delphi pre-surveys, double crux, adversarial collaboration — to record agreement, persistent disagreement and what evidence could change a position. Each contribution lowers the bar for the next: once two or three offices have shaped the text, the fourth joins something already respectable.

What it produces. No public statement, declaration or signatory list. Three private outputs: a better memo — evidence and objections considered in Strategic Memo v3.0, attributed by name only with consent; a coalition map — an anonymized account of convergence and disagreement, with named positions shared only by explicit permission; and, if enough converge, a coalition ready to ask the President for a meeting together. If not, the memo stays on file with the Administration, ready when he reaches for it.

Preparing the US side for dialogue. In early 1946, the Acheson–Lilienthal consultations let Washington align internally, months before it took a proposal for the international control of nuclear weapons to the UN. Same aim here — driven by NGOs, with key national stakeholders, toward a proposal the other side can accept.

Where to go next.

Last updated October 8, 2026.