17 Reasons why Trump Could be Persuaded to co-lead a Bold Global AI Treaty with XI

First, Trump is a very pragmatic politician, guided by his desire to advance America's interests and his own. He appears to rely on his survival and fighter instincts - and the advice of a few advisors that he trusts for loyalty and expertise - rather than ethical or political convictions. He believes in a strong executive and a strong but peaceful US, especially if it includes himself. He boldly pursues highly unorthodox ideas, that are suggested by loyal advisors and sound good to his instinct and, even more, in making sense of them to his voter base.

Second, while he has shown opposition to US federal and state regulation of AI, he has shown no interest in global regulation but has not explicitly opposed the possibility of a deal with China on AI. A detailed analysis suggests that there are small but reasonable chances that he could change course due to his exceedingly pragmatic character, a shifting political context, and decisive advocacy from key influencers.

Third, as of June 2025, 43% of US citizens are very or somewhat concerned that AI could "cause the end of the human race", and such numbers are slated to increase rapidly. According to a 2024 survey, 77% of US voters support a strong international treaty for AI - matching the rise of a similar sentiment among US citizens in the first half of 1946.

Fourth, Trump is much more pragmatic and less doctrinal than his predecessors in his dealings with Russia and China, making him more likely to negotiate a grand deal if a genuine win-win opportunity arises. While the previous administration was set on a unilaterally led alliance of liberal democracies against illiberal states and an "evil China" in a declared AI arms race - with Biden insisting to call Xi a dictator - Trump's pragmatic and transactional foreign policy agenda style could be a great boon for the prospects of strong global coordination on AI. 

Fifth, Trump has acknowledged the danger of AI deepfakes, specifically fearing that a fabricated video of a U.S. president threatening nuclear action could provoke a real nuclear conflict. He also mentioned the possibility of an AI system "going rogue" and overpowering humanity, although he framed this as a hypothetical rather than a personal conviction.

Sixth, he has arguably substantially more political power as president than his predecessors to influence Congress on a bold shift, especially if it is based on well-grounded national security concerns. 

Seventh, the occurrence of a major AI catastrophic accident or further shocking evidence of accelerating AI risks could compel him to act, especially if pressured to by voters.

Eight, the enormous prosperity that AI will bring in a very short time could diminish the perceived need for intense economic competition between global superpowers. The immense potential "pie" that AI would create - if the pie is not blown up to pieces with us - would be making everyone richer and lessen the current incentives for states to engage in economic rivalry at all cost, and coordinate instead to mitigate the risks that could blow up such pie.

Ninth, preventing proliferation of catastrophically dangerous AI is widely expected to be much more challenging than nuclear weapons - and more so as it keeps spreading and advancing globally,  unregulated, requiring broad global compliance. Even if the US wins the race for ASI or military-dominant AI, it would likely result in a catastrophic battle of AIs with China, with everyone losing.

Tenth, the political climate could become more favorable. A drop in his approval ratings, combined with growing public concern about AI, might reflect the political shifts of early 1946, when increased support for international nuclear control led Truman to change his course dramatically. Eventually, America's geopolitical isolation could become a weakness, and a "Baruch Plan for AI" might be repositioned as a demonstration of effective, America-led global coordination—a "deal of the century" that secures US leadership, prevents catastrophe, and establishes a unique historical legacy. 

Eleventh, Trump’s approach to AI aligns with his trademark “brinkmanship-as-bargaining” strategy. By initially rejecting something China clearly wants (global AI safety governance), he positions himself to extract major concessions in exchange for eventually agreeing. His pattern of sharp, rapid escalations against China has often served not as a path to open conflict but as a deliberate move to build leverage before striking a deal. In The Art of the Deal, Trump outlined his playbook: start high, act tough, create leverage, and then negotiate down. What looks like belligerence or erratic escalation is often deliberate, unsettling the opponent, forcing engagement, and making his final proposal appear a concession. Applied to AI, this means Trump can withhold or even dismiss talk of global governance upfront, using it as a chip to extract terms later. By appearing indifferent or even hostile to an AI treaty he actually wants, he primes Beijing to treat any eventual deal as a win. His unpredictability compounds the pressure: if talks fail, he blames the other side for “not meeting his terms”. Unlike most leaders, Trump thrives in summit-style negotiation mode and does not need to posture in advance. He can walk into a China meeting in Beijing salted for this Fall 2025 with maximum ambiguity, then pivot dramatically to claim a “historic deal” on his own terms.

Twelfth, some of Trump’s foreign policy successes — the Abraham Accords in the Middle East, historic summit with Kim Jong Un, pressuring European allies to pay up for defence — show his deftness in using US leverage for American, and global, interests.

Thirteenth, although his record of withdrawing from nuclear treaties during his first term is discouraging, it could be argued that these treaties lacked the third-party transparency enforcement mechanisms needed to incentivize compliance by either party and were relatively very limited in scope. Success in a dual-use AI treaty with a grand deal could restore his perceived ability to negotiate important agreements in the U.S. interest. This reputation had declined after his partial failures in bringing peace to Ukraine and Gaza.

Fourteenth, in a scenario whereby the current apparent all-out war that Musk has waged against Trump will continue in the next months, Trump could have an extra reason to push for a bold global AI treaty. Trump could use the AI treaty to contain Musk. As a bold AI treaty moves forward, scenarios may emerge in which the U.S. government and an international treaty organization gain decisive authority over xAI and other leading AI labs on national and public security grounds. Since Musk appears to have shifted his full focus and resources to his xAI firm, Trump might be motivated to rein in Musk and others before they, or their AIs, challenge his power and that of the U.S. government. 

Fifteenth, and most importantly, a few key influencers on Trump's AI policy could be persuaded to jointly convince him that a well-crafted global treaty is necessary for America and could also be made to fit his interests and image. Just as a few advisors, led by Robert Oppenheimer and Deputy Secretary of State Dean Acheson, persuaded a skeptical Truman of the logic of the Baruch Plan—a small group of trusted, highly skilled entrepreneurs could do the same for Trump.

Sixteenth, In July 2025 the premier of China Li Qiang - following several similar previous Chinese official statements - called for international cooperation on AI and said finding a balance between development and security risks "urgently requires further consensus from the entire society."

Finally, the fact that the Baruch Plan was presented on his date of birth adds a narrative of destiny that could appeal to Trump's vanity: sometimes, the right action is taken for the wrong reasons.